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Community-driven development (CDD) is a response to
perceived failures of top-down, donor-driven development
and reconstruction strategies in alleviating poverty (Pritchett
& Woolcock, 2003). CDD is an approach said to “empower
local community groups, including local governments, by giv-
ing direct control to the community over planning decisions
and investment resources through a process that emphasizes
participatory planning and accountability” (Mansuri & Rao,
2012; World Bank Social Development Department, 2006, p.
6). Many goals are assigned to CDD projects including
improving service delivery and socio-economic wellbeing, as
well as governance and social cohesion at the community level.
In conﬂict-aﬀected contexts, with the belief that there exist
both a need and opportunity for institution building, these lat-
ter goals take on particular salience. To wit, CDD is a central
component in international development assistance to conﬂict-
aﬀected states. The World Bank is the largest supporter of
CDD projects, currently sponsoring more than 400 projects
in 94 countries (Wong, 2012, p. iv) and spending upwards of
$54 billion on CDD during 1999–2011, including over $7.8 bil-
lion in 2010 alone (Mansuri & Rao, 2012, p. 44). This includes
167 CDD projects in 29 conﬂict-aﬀected and fragile states
from 2000 to 2010 (de Regt, Majumdar, & Singh, 2013, p.
5). Bilateral assistance from the United States to “community
participation and development” projects from 2000 to 2011
amounts to $4.3 billion dollars with the top three recipients,
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, all conﬂict-aﬀected states,
while for the UK, such bilateral assistance amounts to about
half a billion dollars with the top three recipients being Nige-
ria, India, and Bangladesh (ﬁgures from aiddata.org). Many
other multilateral and bilateral donors also fund CDD.
Despite rhetorical and ﬁnancial commitments, the proposi-
tion that CDD inputs can generate lasting and transferable
change in attitudes and behavior is much debated. Social
and institutional changes are typically described as slow mov-
ing. To address this debate, this paper synthesizes evidence
from four CDD ﬁeld experiments displaying important meth-
odological and programmatic similarities and recently under-
taken in countries aﬀected by violent conﬂict: Afghanistan,
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Sierra740Leone. Using an approach modeled on the idea of “best evi-
dence synthesis” (Slavin, 1995), we assess prospects for exter-
nally driven 1 “fast-track” institution building, meaning the
strengthening of local capacities for inclusive problem solving
and collective action over the span of a few years. We ﬁnd that
although the CDD programs generally established successful
community-level organizations, broadening the base of partic-
ipation in local development and providing an opportunity for
community members to meaningfully work together to achieve
community goals, the CDD programs in Afghanistan, DRC,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone largely failed to increase the capac-
ity for collective action in a way that is durable and transfer-
able beyond the CDD interventions.
The ﬁrst section provides background on CDD and posi-
tions it theoretically within literature on conﬂict and institu-
tion building. This section also lays out our meaning of
fast-track institution building and the two hypotheses we test.
The second section explains the cases we use and the review
methods. The third section presents our ﬁndings. The fourth
opens a discussion of the ﬁndings, focusing on motivating
assumptions behind CDD programs, program design issues,
and methodological measurement factors. The conclusion
discusses ways forward for research and programing. 22. CDD, CONFLICT, AND INSTITUTION BUILDING
CDDprograms are a mainstay in broader experimentation in
recent decades with decentralized and participatory institutions
for development (Pritchett & Woolcock, 2003). CDD projects
include institution building, planning, and project execution
components. They typically begin with community-level mobi-
lization and training by facilitators in inclusive and transparent
decision-making, leading to the election of community councils
that devise local development plans. This stage is followed by
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processes consistent with their training and using their new
institutions. Finally, the communityworks through the commu-
nity councils andwith the assistance of facilitators to execute the
sub-project, usually a social infrastructure project. The idea is
that these participatory community processes be carried over
into other activities at the end of the CDD program. In discuss-
ing CDD as institution building, we thus refer to institutionaliz-
ing norms of good governance and social cohesion widely
thought important to inclusive problem solving and collective
action. CDD is “fast-track” institution building in that pro-
grams try to achieve these goals in only a few years.
Whether participatory approaches may improve welfare is
debated in the literature (Mansuri & Rao, 2012; Speer,
2012). Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005, 2006) propose that
only when local elite capture can be tamed will such institu-
tions enhance welfare broadly as opposed to contributing to
rent seeking. Khwaja (2004) suggests that boosting participa-
tion only increases welfare when community members have
technical capacity to handle projects. In theory, CDD pro-
grams can overcome challenges of capture and low capacity
through their emphasis on inclusiveness and extended facilita-
tion, although analyses by Ensminger (2010), Fritzen (2007),
Gugerty and Kremer (2002), and Platteau and Gaspart
(2003) suggest diﬃculties of doing so in practice.
In conﬂict-aﬀected contexts, CDD is a convenient mecha-
nism for service delivery in areas where the administrative
reach of state institutions is limited (de Regt et al., 2013;
DFID, 2010; USAID, 2007; World Bank, 2006), where donors
are concerned that central governments are ineﬀective or non-
responsive, or as a way to avert leakage as funds trickle down
through levels of government (Li, 2011). These pragmatic
motivations help to explain the appeal of CDD as a mecha-
nism for service delivery in countries such as Afghanistan,
DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
Beyond service delivery, donors and implementing agencies
emphasize institution building as a goal for CDD programs in
conﬂict-aﬀected areas. This includes fostering social cohesion
(International Rescue Committee, n.d.; USAID, 2007;
World Bank, 2006), “building local governance capacity” (de
Regt et al., 2013; DFID, 2010, p. 29), and leaving behind “sta-
ble, integrated communities that can identify and prioritize
problems, manage conﬂict constructively, tap into local and
external resources to solve problems, and incubate future local
leaders and democratic principles” (USAID, 2007, pp. 20–21).
The very names of CDD projects speak to desired institutional
eﬀects: the programs reviewed below include the Tuungane
project in DRC, Kiswahili for “let’s unite”; GoBifo in Sierra
Leone, Krio for “move forward” or “forward march”; and
the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan. CDD
programs vary in the emphasis they place on these diﬀerent
economic, institutional, and social goals.
The view that there exist both a need and opportunity for
institution building after violent conﬂict has motivated donors
and agencies in their CDD programing in conﬂict-aﬀected
areas (DFID, 2010; USAID, 2007; World Bank, 2006). The
attention to need comes in part from the recognition of a tight
association between poverty and conﬂict around the world
(Collier, 2007; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). Recent policies
toward conﬂict-aﬀected countries have built on the idea that,
above and beyond material consequences, violent civil conﬂict
disrupts social institutions. The World Bank’s seminal Break-
ing the Conﬂict Trap noted that civil wars “can have the eﬀect
of switching behavior from an equilibrium in which there is an
expectation of honesty to one in which there is an expectation
of corruption” and that,Once a country has had a civil war it is far more at risk of
further war. This is partly because war leaves the society
divided and embittered, and partly because war creates
interests that favor continued violence and criminality
(Collier et al., 2003, p. 22).
This proposition is consistent with theoretical analyses of
civil conﬂict that emphasize dynamics of social polarization
due to “security dilemmas” (Posen, 1993; Snyder & Jervis,
1999). Theoretically, by witnessing others’ violent acts, loot-
ing, or otherwise anti-social behaviors, whether such behaviors
are undertaken for venal or justiﬁably self-preserving reasons,
one’s estimation of the trustworthiness of others will be
decreased. This undermines people’s willingness to engage in
trust-based transactions, whether investments in private co-
production or contributions to community or public projects.
Other donor and implementing agencies echo this need logic
when motivating CDD programs in conﬂict-aﬀected contexts.
McBride and D’Onofrio note that in the aftermath of conﬂict,
“local institutions may be weak or non-existent; experience
with good governance is often absent; communities may be
less willing to work together” (2008, p. 1). In their publication
about CDD, Cliﬀe, Guggenheim, and Kostner describe the
impact of violent conﬂict on a country’s economy and soci-
ety [as] profound and multiple. It can be as highly visible as
smashed buildings, maimed civilians, and burst water
mains. But the impact can also be invisible, such as happens
with the collapse of state institutions, the spread of mistrust
in government, and pervasive fear. In both cases, needs are
immense and urgent (2003, p. 1).
A USAID program guide for CDD in conﬂict-aﬀected set-
tings proposes that “[o]ne of the costs of internal violent con-
ﬂict is the loss of community cohesion” (2007, p. 8).
Documentation for post-war programing in Liberia from the
International Rescue Committee puts forth that “conﬂict has
broken community and familial relationships and laid waste
to the trust in institutions deemed essential to the recovery
process” (International Rescue Committee, 2006c, p. 1–2).
Likewise, in documentation for their Tuungane CDD project,
the International Rescue Committee described people in east-
ern DRC as
disempowered, marginalised, and impoverished... [with an]
absence of viable local government and related services and
infrastructure. . .The result is isolated, fragile communities
among some of the poorest in the world, who lack basic
services and the social cohesion and capital necessary to
mobilise local human and physical resources to meet their
own needs (International Rescue Committee, 2006a, p. 5).
In both scholarly and policy circles, these social and institu-
tional impacts of violent conﬂict are often asserted and
assumed rather than demonstrated and speciﬁed.
At the same time, the policy literature proposes that there
may be a silver lining: conﬂict’s disruption of social institu-
tions creates an opportunity for institutional reconstruction.
The USAID program guide for CDD in conﬂict-aﬀected set-
tings suggests that the “breakdown of systems in conﬂict set-
tings creates an opportunity to revisit negative social
dynamics, such as domination by elites or a particular ethnic
or religious group, and to foster healthier dynamics” (2007,
p. 6). A World Bank policy report refers to “new ‘development
spaces’” that arise as conﬂict unsettles the status quo (2006, p.
12). In their documentation for programs in Liberia and the
DRC, the International Rescue Committee highlights situa-
tions of “huge suﬀering but also huge potential” and the
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peace” (International Rescue Committee, 2006a; International
Rescue Committee, 2006b). Some suggest that the opportunity
for shifting gender roles may be particularly great (Fuest,
2008). This optimism is consistent with seminal work in social
science that has emphasized the importance of crises (Ostrom,
1990, pp. 207–8) or critical junctures (Acemoglu & Robinson,
2012) as moments of institutional change as well as important
scholarship highlighting moments of “social creativity” fol-
lowing dramatic crises such as wars (Cramer, 2006, pp. 40–
44, 279) and the possibility of a “phoenix factor” whereby
countries devastated by war exhibit a potential to perform at
a higher level economically than would be the case in the
absence of war (Organski & Kugler, 1977).
CDD programs would seem to be perfectly designed to
address such need and seize such windows of opportunity
for reconstructing local social institutions. While there was
no single originating theory on which post-conﬂict CDD pro-
grams were based, international donors and agencies engaged
in CDD programs have come to agree on a common set of
motivating propositions that link “inputs” to institutional
“outputs” and desired “outcomes” (Cliﬀe, Guggenheim, &
Kostner, 2003; DFID, 2010; International Development
Association, 2009; McBride & D’Onofrio, 2008; USAID,
2007; World Bank, 2006). As described above, key inputs
include facilitation, establishment, or recognition of inclusive
community organizations for deciding development priorities,
and administration of block grants to ﬁnance development
projects chosen through the organization. The institutional
outputs include broad-based participation in the process,
potentially shifting existing power arrangements to be more
inclusive, providing community members with a (presumably
positive) experience of working together, and providing com-
munity members a sense of ownership over local development
activities and therefore an inducement to hold accountable
those implementing development projects. These propositions
echo what Vajja and White (2008) refer to as the “hippy”
model of participatory development and what Mansuri and
Rao refer to as “the exercise of voice and choice” (2012, p.
15). The institutional outputs come alongside material out-
puts—typically social infrastructure such as school facilities,
water, and sanitation projects, irrigation projects, roads, and
community centers. These “quick wins” are intended to show
citizens the tangible beneﬁts of peace and the potential that
might arise when community members work together.
Given these inputs and outputs, the ultimate hoped-for
institutional outcome is a sustainable and transferable boost
to capacities for cooperative problem solving and collective
action. The “learning by doing” and “demonstration eﬀects”
are expected to generate sustained patterns of cooperative
problem solving. In other words, by participating in eﬀective
collective action, community-members should be better pre-
pared for future collective action and willing to draw on these
social and institutional models for non-CDD activity. Casey
et al. interpret the CDD process as one that reduces the mar-
ginal cost of public goods provision through block grants
(ﬁnancial subsidies) and reduces the ﬁxed costs of collective
action by requiring participation and endeavoring to inculcate
democratic norms. The “learning by doing” idea is that
through the resultant increase in community participation,
alongside the establishment of village-level development and
decision-making institutions (Village Development Councils,
Plans, and Bank Accounts), future, post-project, collective
action will be less costly to implement (2012a, pp.1764–7).In conﬂict-aﬀected areas, the CDD policy literature posits
that these institutional outcomes can help build peace. Fearon
et al. cite World Bank policy documents proposing that “by
improving public goods provision or enhancing cohesion,
[CDD] may reduce the risk of renewed conﬂict by lessening
local grievances or facilitating economic development, which
may in turn reduce the incentives to participation in violence”
(Fearon, Humphreys, & Weinstein, 2008, p. 4). We can sum
up these arguments with the following general hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. The establishment and operation of community
level CDD organizations broadens the base of participation in
local development decision-making, providing the community
a novel opportunity to work together equitably and cooper-
atively to generate material improvements that meet collec-
tively agreed-upon needs.Hypothesis 2. CDD generates learning-by-doing or demon-
stration eﬀects that increase a community’s capacity for inclu-
sive and cooperative problem solving and collective action in a
manner that is durable and transferable.
The idea that brief exposure to CDD inputs can generate
lasting and transferable change in attitudes and behavior,
what we term “fast-track institution building,” is a debated
proposition. In their discussion of the motivations for the
Tuungane CDD project in the DRC, Humphreys et al. note
that “the basic principle behind [CDD]. . .runs largely counter
to classic accounts of the determinants of social behavior that
emphasize structural and slow moving features” (2012, p. 19).
Such accounts include work by Miguel (2004), Putnam (1993),
North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), and Nunn (2008) on how
current societal patterns of cooperation are the accumulated
product of major historical forces over decades if not centu-
ries. Mansuri and Rao question the idea that that there can
be a straightforward relationship between the types of inputs
that CDD delivers and institutional change: “It is instead
likely to proceed along a punctuated equilibrium where long
periods of seeming quietude are followed by intense, and often
turbulent, change” (2012, p. 12). Vajja and White’s review of
CDD programs in Malawi and Zambia lead them to question
the idealized vision that “all community members enter the
decision-making sphere on an equal footing, and can agree
on a common interest without intra-community conﬂicts”
(2008, p. 1148). Generalizing these critiques, one might ask
whether the ideal-type theory of change that has motivated
CDD programing in conﬂict-aﬀected areas underplays the
radicalness of institutional change (Mansuri & Rao, 2012,
pp. 98–9).
The theoretical literature also raises the possibility of
adverse consequences. The establishment of CDD in places
where customary institutions are already in place may increase
the number of decision-makers, possibly creating conﬂict or
confusion over the distribution of responsibilities and increas-
ing the number of actors empowered to extract rents (Bardhan
& Mookherjee, 2005; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Beath,
Christia, & Enikolopov, 2013b; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).
The result may be harmful to community welfare.
Theory alone is inadequate for establishing whether the
optimistic or pessimistic accounts are more plausible. What
we need is rigorous empirical evidence on the eﬀects of
CDD programs on the collective action capacity of communi-
ties. A series of randomized ﬁeld experiments over the past six
years provides us with such evidence.
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We focus on four randomized ﬁeld experiments drawn from
a systematic search of all CDD programs undertaken in con-
ﬂict-aﬀected countries. 3 The studies cover phases of Afghani-
stan’s National Solidarity Program from 2007 to 2010 (Beath,
Christia, & Enikolopov, 2012; Beath, Christia, & Enikolopov,
2013a; Beath et al., 2013b), the Tuungane program in eastern
DRC from 2007 to 2010 (Humphreys, Sanchez de la Sierra,
& van der Windt, 2012), Liberia’s Community-Driven Recon-
struction Program in Lofa County from 2006 to 2008 (Fearon,
Humphreys, & Weinstein, 2011; Fearon et al., 2008), and
Sierra Leone’s GoBifo program implemented in one northern
and one southern region from 2006 to 2009 (Casey,
Glennerster, & Miguel, 2011; Casey, Glennerster, & Miguel,
2012a; Casey, Glennerster, & Miguel, 2012b). Sierra Leone
and Liberia are post-conﬂict contexts, with peace agreements
in 2002 and 2003 respectively. Many peacebuilding challenges
remain, however, and both countries linger at the bottom of
the human development index (177th and 174nd of 186,
respectively). In contrast, conﬂict is ongoing in Afghanistan
and DRC; these two states are near the top of the failed state
index (7th and 2nd) and the bottom (175th and 186th) of the
human development index (Messner et al., 2013; UNDP,
2013). All four have hosted major international peacekeeping
operations and multitudes of peacebuilding and development
organizations.
The CDD interventions themselves are quite similar in terms
of basic program components, as shown in Table 1. Nonethe-
less, there are some diﬀerences in the program designs, asTable 2. Distinguishing ch
Case Primary funder Implementer
Afghanistan National
Solidarity Program
World Bank
(International Development
Association and Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund)
Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation
and Development
with 28 NGOs
DRC Tuungane DFID NGOs (IRC and CA
Liberia CDR DFID IRC
Sierra Leone GoBifo Japan Social
Development Fund
(Government of Japan
and World Bank)
Ministry of Internal
Aﬀairs, Local Govern
and Rural Developm
a,b See King (2013) footnotes 19 and 21 on source documentation for these ﬁg
Table 1. Study and ca
Evaluation study Case Main program
components
Beath, Christia, and
Enikopolov (2012)
Afghanistan National
Solidarity Program
Election of village
development councils;
block grants
Humphreys et al. (2012) DRC Tuungane Election of village
development councils;
block grants
Fearon et al. (2008) Liberia CDR in
Lofa Program
Election of village
development councils;
block grants
Casey et al. (2011) Sierra Leone GoBifo Election of village
development councils;
block grantsshown in Table 2. These include diﬀerences in funders, extent
of government versus NGO administration, implementation
timeframes, amounts invested, and the sizes of the target com-
munities. Other diﬀerences that are more diﬃcult to quantify
include the types of projects that were barred from funding
through the block grants, who exactly controlled the disburse-
ment and application of block grants, and the nature of
co-ﬁnancing by communities that the program required.
Another important qualiﬁcation is that the manner of program
implementation varied to some extent within each case. In
Afghanistan, for instance, the 28 implementing NGOs had
much discretion on programing in their respective areas
(Maynard, 2007), while in Liberia one NGO (the International
Rescue Committee) implemented all programs and did so in a
relatively compact geographic area. Nevertheless, the programs
and evaluation methods are much more consistent than those
explored in other reviews (King, Samii, & Snilstveit, 2010;
Mallett & Slater, 2013; Mansuri & Rao, 2012; Wong, 2012).
Table 3 shows project goals as culled from program docu-
mentation and the impact studies. From these quotes, it is clear
that the programs sought to do more than create committees
and deliver short-term services, and rather sought to eﬀect
social and institutional change. A critic might point out that
tangible returns in the form of sub-projects appear to be the
least ambitious goal of CDD. Increasing short-term socio-eco-
nomic welfare is more ambitious. Eﬀecting long-term social
and institutional change, the goals upon which we focus here,
is more ambitious still, and that ours may therefore be an
unjust focus. Nonetheless, these quotes indicate that the “ideal
type” theory that we are testing is not a strawman as it is in factaracteristics of cases
Months of
implementation
Total
investment
per capitaa
Investment
per
capita/12 mos.a
Sizes of
host
“communities”b
37 $20.40 $6.62 1,044
RE) 35 $10.00 $3.43 1,300
16 $8.00 $6.00 2,500
ment
ent
43 $16.00 $4.47 300
ures, respectively.
se characteristics
Program
start date
Program
end date
Evaluation
endline date
Sample size
September 2007 October 2010 May–October 2011 250 treated,
250 control
July 2007 June 2010 August 2010 280 treated,
280 control
November 2006 March 2008 July–September 2008 41 treated,
41 control
January 2006 July 2009 May–June 2009 and
October 2009
118 treated,
118 control
Table 3. Project Goals
Project Goals as per project documentation and/or evaluations
Afghanistan “The key objective of NSP is to build, strengthen, and maintain Community Development Councils (CDCs) as
eﬀective institutions for local governance and social-economic development” (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, n.d.).
Beath et al. add that the program “explicitly mentions promoting gender equality as one of the program’s main goals”
(Beath et al., 2012b, p. 6).
DRC “To improve the stability and quality of life for communities in eastern DRC through structured, participatory, and
inclusive collective action. By establishing and strengthening participatory local governance committees [the program
aims. . .] to improve the understanding and practice of democratic governance, improve citizens’ relationships with local
government, and improve social cohesion and thereby communities’ ability to resolve conﬂict peacefully. The conduit
to achieve these purposes will be village- and community-level projects that themselves will contribute to socio-
economic rehabilitation as DRC moves into a post-conﬂict and development period” (Humphreys et al., 2012, p. 11).
“While people’s vision of democracy’s dividends [in anticipation of Congolese elections] is in all probability unrealistic
in time and scope, it is nevertheless vital that they receive tangible returns for their enduring tolerance. It is thus crucial
that the post-election period deliver peace dividends. . .” (International Rescue Committee, 2006a, p. 11).
Liberia “. . .the project aims to improve material welfare, build institutions and promote community cohesion by bringing
together all actors within the community, including local government, civil society and private sector to identify
priority problems/needs and to develop community action plans for implementation.” (International Rescue
Committee, 2006b, p. 1).
“This model was adopted, in part, as a strategy for using local leadership to quickly generate material improvements
in people’s lives. Given the state of the government after ﬁfteen years of civil war communities could plausibly also
move more quickly than government to deliver a tangible peace dividend” (Fearon et al., 2008, pp. 2–3).
Sierra Leone “Through intensive, long term facilitation, CDD aims to strengthen local institutions, make them more democratic and
inclusive of marginalized groups, and enhance the capacity of communities to engage in collective action” (Casey et al.,
2011c, p. 1).
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grams and arose repeatedly in the interviews we describe below.
These four studies represent, as far as we know, the full set of
randomized ﬁeld experiments on this topic for which results
were available and show important methodological consis-
tency. 4 Each of the four studies we review was a well-powered
(in a statistical sense) randomized ﬁeld experiment. The
researchers carried out the randomization in collaboration
with implementers, using public lotteries to select program
communities from broader pools of eligible communities. Each
compares outcomes in program areas to credible approxima-
tions of the counterfactual of “what would have been” with
no program (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Banerjee & Duﬂo,
2011; Karlan & Appel, 2011). Moreover, the four studies were
informed by a similar set of substantive hypotheses and were
each subject to academic scrutiny prior to being ﬁelded.
Indeed, Beath et al. (2012), Casey et al. (2011), Casey et al.
(2012a), and Humphreys et al. (2012) registered their hypothe-
ses and pre-analysis plans prior to going into the ﬁeld. The pre-
analysis plans guard against “data snooping” and other threats
to validity arising from having many statistical tests from
which one could strategically choose results that favor one or
another argument (Anderson, 2008; Casey et al., 2012a;
Humphreys, Sanchez de la Sierra, & van der Windt, 2013).
While we raise a number of methodological issues in the discus-
sion below, these studies provide highly credible tests of
whether presumed eﬀects of CDD were in fact operative.
Synthesizing results is nonetheless a challenge. Scholars
have not standardized measures of institutional change in a
manner that corresponds to what one has in medical or educa-
tion research. A reason may be that appropriate conceptual-
izations of institutional change may be highly context
speciﬁc (Mansuri & Rao, 2004, p. 31). While some concepts,
such as “trust”, ﬁnd universal application in the social sci-
ences, studies still vary in the way that they precisely deﬁne
and measure such concepts (King et al., 2010). The four stud-
ies vary in the way that they measure social and institutional
eﬀects. Hypothesis 1 from our theory section focuses on
whether CDD interventions changed participation habits
and attitudes toward such participation in communitydevelopment decision-making. The studies in our synthesis
measure such changes in terms of participation rates, percep-
tions about who should be involved in community decision-
making, and whether CDD-established decision-making
bodies were eﬀective. Hypothesis 2 focuses on whether CDD
interventions aﬀect communities’ durable and transferable
capacities for inclusive and cooperative problem solving and
collective action. The studies measure such eﬀects in terms
of performance in collective tasks beyond CDD program
activities as well as generalized attitudes toward rights and
inter-personal and inter-group relations. A trend in the four
studies is a shift away from exclusively survey-based measure-
ment to the inclusion of behavioral measures such as economic
games and structured “real life” activities, described in Table 4.
In addition to reviewing the results included in the published
studies, we conducted ﬁfteen interviews with experts on CDD
in conﬂict-aﬀected areas, including at least one author from
each study, authors of past reviews, and practitioners from
implementing agencies. 5 These interviews provided us with
insights on researchers’ intentions behind various research
design strategies and their suggested interpretations of the
ﬁndings. They also provided practitioner perspectives on the
rationales behind program design features and inner workings
of the programs in relation to local-level contexts. We refer to
these interviews in our discussion of the empirical ﬁndings
below.
We synthesize the results of these four studies by focusing
on how their ﬁndings relate to the two hypotheses derived
above. Our approach is modeled on the principle of “best evi-
dence synthesis,” in which one focuses attention on results
from studies of exceptional rigor and generalizability and pre-
sents results from these studies side-by-side in a comparable
format, using contextual information to ﬂesh out the implica-
tions of the ﬁndings (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006, pp. 181–183;
Slavin, 1995). Our ability to synthesize results is limited by the
rather diﬀerent measurement strategies used in the studies. 6
Thus, we do not go so far as to perform a quantitative
meta-analysis or to combine eﬀect estimates across studies.
Rather, we provide a narrative synthesis that still allows us
to derive general conclusions.
Table 4. Behavioral measures
Case Targeted behavior Type and description of behavioral measure
Afghanistan (1) The quality of the targeting—whether aid recipients
were among the vulnerable members of the community; (2)
The extent of corruption—whether village leaders retained
aid for themselves or for their relatives.
A distribution of wheat was organized to assess how NSP aﬀects
the quality of local governance. Village leaders in 491 communities
in the sample received wheat from the World Food Program to
distribute it to the needy. To get at the mechanisms behind the
eﬀect of local institutions, there was a randomized variation in
whether the wheat was handed out for distribution to people who
are considered village leaders by the villagers themselves or whether
elected oﬃcials or women are explicitly required to participate in
the process (Beath et al., 2013a).
DRC “Did areas that took part in Tuungane engage diﬀerently
with RAPID relative to those that did not?” (Humphreys
et al., 2012, 7).
A new intervention called RAPID was designed to assess the
impact of the CDD program. 560 communities (half of which
participated in Tuungane and the other half did not) were selected
to participate in an unconditional cash transfer program in which
they would receive grants of $1,000 to be used on village projects.
Communities were actually told that they would be receiving $900,
but $1,000 was in fact given in order to provide a measurement of
whether leaders report unanticipated gains to populations. There
were no guidance as to who should manage the funds and how
decisions should be made (Humphreys et al., 2012, pp. 29–31).
Liberia “Observe how communities conduct themselves when they
confront major decisions and to what extent they are able
to mobilize participation from community members”
(Fearon et al., 2008, 25).
A community-wide public goods game, entirely separate from
project implementers and evaluators, was announced one week in
advance to communities. On game day, individuals were then
selected at random from 24 randomly selected households, given
approximately 5USD, and asked to privately decide how much to
contribute to the community and how much to keep for
themselves. There were also variants in this public goods game in
which women only groups played the game, and in which there
were variations in the amount of interest on community
contributions (Fearon et al., 2008, 25; Fearon et al., 2011).
Sierra Leone Respectively, (1) ability for collective action; (2)
participation and quality of participation; (3) elite capture
and collective action.
Three “structured community activities” provided communities an
asset and an opportunity, allowing the study team to observe how
communities responded. These entailed (1) vouchers to each
community that could only be redeemed if matching funds were
raised; (2) community choice of one gift among two options; (3)
gift of one tarp to each community (Casey et al., 2011, pp. 21–2).
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We consider evidence from each of the studies in relation to
our two hypotheses related to CDD and fast-track institution
building. Table 5 contains eﬀect estimates associated with
hypotheses 1 and 2. Table 5 reports indicators, associated con-
trol group means (when available), estimated treatment eﬀects
(diﬀerence between treatment and control group means as
reported in published results), standard errors, and t-statistics.
The ﬁrst column indicates with which hypothesis the eﬀect is
associated. Many of the indicators that were used in the stud-
ies took the form of standardized indices. The study authors
constructed these indices from batteries of survey questions
or performance indicators. Each of these items is assumed to
provide some information on conditions relating to an
abstract concept (e.g., “perception that village assembly pro-
vides services,” “activeness of participation,” or “eﬃcacy”).
By combining the information from the various measures,
one both avoids problems associated with multiple testing
and also gets a more precise measure for the aggregate concept
than would be provided by any of the items in isolation
(Anderson, 2008; Casey et al., 2012a). These indices are usu-
ally standardized relative to the control group distribution,
which is why so many of the indicators have control group
means near zero. The eﬀect sizes are therefore in terms of con-
trol group (or, more meaningfully, counterfactual outcome
distribution) standard deviations.Hypothesis 1 proposed that CDD interventions would pro-
duce novel, broad-based, and positive experience of participa-
tion in an eﬀective community decision-making process. The
studies provided statistics on attendance rates in program
activities, although it is diﬃcult to know whether these rates
represent “good” or “bad” quantities of participation for each
context, to say nothing of quality. 7More illuminating are esti-
mates of eﬀects of CDD programs on broad-based community
level participation in decision-making during the time of the
program, whether decisions during the CDD program gener-
ated outputs that a broad range of community members val-
ued, and whether the community appreciated their
participation in community decision-making. The Afghanistan
study by Beath et al. (2013a) provides considerable leverage on
these questions because it includes a midline evaluation under-
taken in the middle of the implementation period of the pro-
ject. Their results largely support hypothesis 1, as shown in
Table 5 (indicators 1–6). During the project period, Beath
et al. found that individuals in CDD program communities
attended more village assemblies, although the magnitude of
the eﬀect was rather small. Nonetheless, the CDD program
greatly increased women’s participation in village councils,
perceptions that the village assemblies provided services (and
services for women in particular), and participation in local
governance during the term of the program. Finally, with
respect to perceptions of the importance of broad-based
participation, Beath et al. found signiﬁcant increases in
Table 5. Estimated eﬀects on capacities for cooperative problem solving and collective action
Hyp. Indicator Control mean Treatment Eﬀect Standard Error t-Statistic
Afghanistan (National Solidarity Program)
1 1 Number of assembly meetings attended annually (midline) NA 0.10 0.03 3.33*
1 2 Woman is a member in village council (midline) NA 0.54 0.04 13.50*
1 3 Std. index of perception that village assembly provides governance
services (midline)
0.00 0.36 0.11 3.27*
1 4 Std. index of preference for village assembly to provide local
governance services (midline)
0.00 0.05 0.02 2.18*
1 5 Probability that development project preferences change as a result of
past demands being met
NA 0.01 0.18 0.06
1 6 Std. index of participation in local governance (midline) 0.00 0.10 0.03 3.29*
2 7 Number of assembly meetings attended annually (endline) NA 0.01 0.04 0.37
2 8 Woman is a member in village council (endline) NA 0.38 0.03 11.24*
2 9 Std. index of perception that village assembly provides services
(endline)
0.00 0.12 0.11 1.07
2 10 Std. index of perception that village assembly provides services to
women (endline)
0.00 0.14 0.04 3.45*
2 11 Std. index of perception that village assembly mediates disputes or
provides notary services (endline)
0.00 0.02 0.38 0.06
2 12 Std. index of preference for village assembly to provide local
governance (endline)
0.00 0.03 0.15 0.21
2 13 Std. index for objective measure of targeting vulnerable households in
VBDA food distribution (non-CDC mandate condition)
0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
2 14 Std. index for subjective measure of targeting vulnerable households in
VBDA food distribution (non-CDC mandate condition)
0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04
2 15 Std. index of embezzlement in VBDA food distribution 0.00 0.10 0.06 1.73
2 16 Std. index of village leader nepotism in VBDA food distribution 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.58
2 17 Std. index of participation in VBDA food distribution decision-
making
0.00 0.07 0.04 1.65
2 18 Std. index of intra-village dispute resolution 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.25
2 19 Std. index of interpersonal trust 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.91
Source: Beath et al. (2013).
Sample: 7,189 men and 6,622 women in 447 villages.
DRC (Tuungane)
1 20 Share of villagers saying they are free to participate in decision-making 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.92
1 21 Share of women on committee 0.16 0.03 0.02 1.63*
2 22 Std. index of perceptions that leaders are duty bound to citizens 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.33
2 23 Std. index of perceptions that citizens have a duty to contribute to
governing
0.00 0.02 0.05 0.40
2 24 Std. index of participation in public goods provision 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.20
2 25 Std. index of attitudes toward women and governance 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.14
2 26 RAPID meeting number of attendees 130.48 1.98 7.40 0.27
2 27 Std. index of activeness of participation in RAPID deliberations 0.00 0.12 0.09 1.33
2 28 Std. index of using electoral process for RAPID planning 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.78
2 29 Share aware of RAPID grant value 0.38 0.01 0.03 0.42
2 30 Std. index of level of community oversight of village RAPID
committees
0.00 0.01 0.10 0.10
2 31 Diﬀerential in RAPID beneﬁts allocated to migrants 0.69 1.83 1.56 1.17
2 32 Std. index of activeness in pursuing support from external actors 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.20
2 33 Share willing to participate in exercise to collect information on public
resource management
0.38 0.04 0.03 1.13
2 34 Std. index of willingness to lend money to others in community (trust) 0.00 0.07 0.05 1.40
2 35 Std. index of perception of inter-group cleavages in community 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.20
2 36 Proportion willing to share hypothetical grant with other villages 0.50 0.01 0.03 0.32
Source: Humphreys et al. (2012).
Sample: varies from estimate to estimate—e.g., ca. 150–450 communities for RAPID estimates, ca. 1,500–5,000 respondents for survey estimates.
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Table 5—(continued)
Hyp. Indicator Control mean Treatment Eﬀect Standard Error t-Statistic
Liberia (CDR in Lofa Program)
1 37 Std. index of eﬃcacy 0.00 0.51 0.20 2.55*
1 38 Std. index of participation 0.02 0.54 0.21 2.54*
2 39 Avg. share of 300 Liberian dollars shared in public goods game 0.76 0.07 0.03 2.50*
2 40 Std. index of women’s rights 0.01 0.33 0.20 1.63
2 41 Std. index of democraticness 0.00 0.32 0.18 1.78
2 42 Std. index of inclusion of excombatants 0.01 0.54 0.21 2.54*
2 43 Std. index of inclusion of migrants 0.02 0.53 0.19 2.71*
2 44 Std. index of trust in leaders 0.00 0.63 0.21 3.09*
2 45 Std. index of reduced tensions 0.00 0.48 0.21 2.24*
2 46 Std. index of social capital 0.02 0.45 0.20 2.28*
Source: Fearon et al. (2008), Fearon et al. (2011).
Sample: 83 communities.
Sierre Leone (GoBifo)
1 47 Std. index for a functioning development committee that delivers
beneﬁts
0.00 0.35 0.03 11.73*
1 48 Std. index of participation in local governance 0.00 0.11 0.05 2.43*
2 48 Std. index of inclusion and participation community decisions 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
2 50 Std. index of access to information on local governance 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08
2 51 Std. index of collective action and public goods contribution 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.98
2 52 Std. index of trust 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.66
2 53 Std. index of group and network ties 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.75
2 54 Std. index of crime and conﬂict reduction 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.52
Source: Casey et al. (2011), Casey et al. (2012a).
Sample: 236 communities.
“Std. index” refers to a summary index of outcomes standardized with respect to control group means and standard deviations.
Standard errors for indicators 4, 6, and 13–19 inferred from reported p-values.
“NA” means the statistic was not available from information in the published results.
* p < .05 for two-way test of null of no treatment eﬀect.
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manage village projects and resolve disputes. The one ﬁnding
that runs contrary to these generally positive trends is that peo-
ple did not update their development project preferences in
light of previously prioritized needs having been met by the
CDD project.
Humphreys et al. also found mostly positive eﬀects in rela-
tion to hypothesis 1. The Tuungane “projects were imple-
mented according to plan” (2012, p. 15) and nearly 70% of
all projects were matched to villagers’ preferences (2012, p.
24). 81% of the population reported Tuungane to be “helpful”
and only 2% reported it to be harmful (2012, p. 19). The share
of women on councils increased in Tuungane communities.
Nonetheless, the share of villagers saying that they were free
to participate in decision-making was not higher in project
communities. 8
The Sierra Leone study (Casey et al., 2011; Casey et al.,
2012a) too found positive eﬀects with respect to hypothesis
1. Casey et al. used an index that aggregated items measuring
the proper functioning of local development committees and
their ability to deliver tangible beneﬁts, ﬁnding that the
CDD program signiﬁcantly boosted the potential for this to
happen. Respondents reported that roughly 38% of these deci-
sions were made by the chief and other leaders, with 43% of
decisions made by “everyone”, 1% made by an outsider, and
18% unknown (Casey et al., 2011, p. 32). Similarly, they found
that the CDD program boosted local levels of participation in
community decision-making during the project implementa-
tion period. 9 As for the material projects that were selected
as part of the CDD program, Casey et al. indicated “the pro-
gram did what it said it would” (2011, p. 1).Finally, in Liberia, Fearon et al. (2011) found a statistically
signiﬁcant increase in their index measures of participants’
eﬃcacy and participation. Nonetheless, there was no signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence between the average share who reported
selected projects were among “most important” for the village
in treatment and control communities (Fearon et al., 2008,
p. 29). In sum, the kinds of immediate eﬀects covered by
hypothesis 1 were generally realized.
Hypothesis 2 proposed that through the kinds of eﬀects cov-
ered by hypothesis 1, and learning-by-doing or demonstration
eﬀects, CDD interventions would generate a transferable and
durable increase in a community’s capacity for cooperative
problem solving and collective action. For eﬀects on inclusive
and cooperative problem solving and collective action to be
“durable and transferable,” it must be that they alter behavior
in situations that require collective action but that are distant
in terms of time or functional domain relative to the CDD pro-
gram itself – in otherwords, that people use the processes and/or
values developed through CDD for non-CDD program pur-
poses. This idea motivated the behavioral outcome strategies
described in Table 4, involving new opportunities for collective
action, after the end of the CDD programs. These behavioral
outcome strategies form the core of our assessment of hypothe-
sis 2, although we also draw on other indicators, such as survey-
basedmeasures of intra-community trust. As Table 5 shows, the
studies cast doubt on the validity of hypothesis 2, with the Libe-
ria study standing out as something of an outlier.
In Afghanistan, Beath et al. (2013a) found in their endline
evaluation that CDD communities did not exhibit signiﬁcantly
higher levels of attendance in village assemblies, perceptions
that village assemblies provide services, or preference for village
748 WORLD DEVELOPMENTassemblies to provide governance. This is despite the fact that at
midline (and thus during the implementation period) CDD vil-
lages performed better on all of thesemeasures. Their behavioral
“village beneﬁts distribution activity” (VBDA) showed no
signiﬁcant eﬀects of CDD on whether vulnerable households
were targeted for beneﬁts, whether embezzlement or nepotism
was reduced, or extent of participation in the VBDA decision-
making. As for within-village social cohesion, Beath et al. found
no signiﬁcant eﬀects onmeasures of intra-village dispute resolu-
tion capacities or interpersonal trust. The one exception to this
general trend of null results was for women’s empowerment
outcomes: they found that CDD signiﬁcantly increased
women’s representation in village councils and increased the
extent of village assembly service provision to women.
For Humphreys et al.’s (2012) DRC study, there is nothing
from either theRAPIDassessment (non-conditional cash trans-
fer exercise) or other indicators of village-level collective action
or cohesion to indicate signiﬁcant social or institutional eﬀects.
Humphreys et al. found no signiﬁcant eﬀects of CDD on atten-
dance in RAPID meetings, activeness of participation in such
meetings, use of electoral processes, awareness of details of
the RAPID grants, community oversight in RAPID activities,
or allocation of beneﬁts to vulnerable communities such as
migrants. Neither did they ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects on com-
munities’ capacities to engage external actors for support, rates
of participation in various forms of community-level collective
action, or indicators of trust and intra-village cohesion.
For Sierra Leone, Casey et al. (2012a) constructed indices
for various social and institutional outcomes using a combina-
tion of their structured community activities and survey ques-
tionnaires. They found no signiﬁcant eﬀects on indicators for
inclusion and participation in community decisions, access
to information on local governance, collective action and
public goods contribution, trust, group and network ties, or
intra-village crime and conﬂict resolution.
The one exception to this general trend of null ﬁndings is the
Liberia study of Fearon et al. (2011). This study did ﬁnd that
CDD caused signiﬁcantly higher levels of cooperative play in
an incentivized public goods game that they designed, and this
eﬀect came along with increases in survey-based measures of
women’s rights, endorsement of democratic norms, inclusive-
ness of vulnerable groups such as ex-combatants and migrants,
trust in local leaders, reduced tensions, and various forms of
social capital. The results from the public goods game, how-
ever, require qualiﬁcation. In examining these eﬀects in more
detail, Fearon et al. note that signiﬁcant eﬀects were found only
when the game was played in a mixed-gender, rather than
women-only, conﬁguration, which is not a commonly occur-
ring situation in Liberia. While the games may, therefore, dem-
onstrate durable and transferable change, the opportunities for
community-members to use the CDD-inspired institutions are
limited and the change does not carry over to problems for
which the rules may include male only or female only solutions.
In conﬂict-aﬀected contexts, the possibility of adverse eﬀects
is of particular concern. Along these lines, Beath et al. found
that in Afghanistan, the mandated female participation
requirement in the CDD program created some tension in
communities, sometimes resulting in women “being denied
meaningful participation in the program, despite a strong
interest, and projects favored by or beneﬁtting women getting
de-prioritized by powerful male elites” (2012a, p. 8, citing
Boesen 2004; Brick 2008). For Sierra Leone, while Casey
et al. (2012a) found no adverse eﬀects at the level of their
aggregate indices, they did ﬁnd occasional negative eﬀects
associated with some of their component indicators. Of the
59 outcome variables included in their index related to collec-tive action and contributions to local public goods, 7 treat-
ment eﬀects met a 95% conﬁdence level of statistical
signiﬁcance, 5 positive and 2 negative, aggregating to a “zero
eﬀect when considered as a group” (Casey et al., 2011, p. 37).
The general thrust of the ﬁndings is that while CDD pro-
grams can consistently create venues for broad-based partici-
pation in eﬀective development decision-making during the
CDD intervention, this experience does not typically generate
durable and transferable capacities for cooperative problem
solving and collective action. The Liberia study stands as
something of an exception, but closer inspection suggests that
the diﬀerences are not as pronounced as they ﬁrst appear.
A counter-argument might be that by focusing on social and
institutional goals, we have centered on goals that are too
ambitious. If a project succeeds in meeting its less ambitious
goals, but fails to meet its most ambitious goals, should we
consider it a failure overall? 10 In terms of economic welfare,
the study in Sierra Leone stands out for its positive results,
measured by a “standard index of general economic welfare.”
For the study from Afghanistan, the endline results are mixed:
while there is no substantial eﬀect on income, consumption,
assets, or food insecurity, women perceived that their eco-
nomic situation had improved. The studies from DRC and
Liberia do not ﬁnd positive economic eﬀects. 11
Recent reviews of CDD in non-conﬂict settings come to con-
clusions that are broadly consistent with the ﬁndings presented
here. Mansuri and Rao (2012) draw on nearly 500 studies of
participatory development or decentralization programs, ﬁnd-
ing that while some outcomes tend to beneﬁt from such local-
ized and participatory approaches (resource sustainability and
the quality of infrastructure), these programs fail to live up to
their promise in contributing to long-lasting social and institu-
tional change. Wong (2012) has a more narrow focus on
World Bank-funded CDD programs evaluated to rigorous
impact evaluation standards (though generally quasi-experi-
mental). She ﬁnds that across the programs there is strong evi-
dence for improved access to, and use of, services such as
water and education, as well as positive eﬀects on economic
welfare (a more encouraging ﬁnding than here). However,
the evidence on social or institutional eﬀects is much less
consistent and often lacking, although such eﬀects are not
examined at all in many studies that she reviews.
Overall, this synthesis does not lead to a conclusion that
CDD, as currently designed or conceptualized, is a “proven
impact” intervention (IPA website, n.d.): while CDD has been
tested using rigorous methods, the theory of change is inade-
quately clear, results mixed or null, and our knowledge about
cost-eﬀectiveness relative to other potential approaches very
little.5. DISCUSSION
Why do CDD interventions fail to meet expectations of
social and institutional transformation in conﬂict-aﬀected con-
texts? In our discussion that follows we propose some answers,
marshaling available evidence to evaluate their plausibility.
We focus on issues related to motivating assumptions,
program design, and evaluation methodology, with context
as a common thread across all three.
(a) Motivating assumptions: need and opportunity
Consider ﬁrst the motivating assumptions behind CDD pro-
grams in conﬂict-aﬀected contexts: that there exist both a need
and opportunity for institution building. Contrary to assump-
Table 6. Baseline levels of governance and social cohesion
Case Participation in
governance
Trust Democratic norms Membership in groups Conﬂict/tensions
Afghanistan
National
Solidarity
Program
Both male and female
respondents reported
having attended the last
council meetings at 35%
and 47% respectively
(Beath, Christia, &
Enikolopov, 2008, p.
viii).
Eighty-four percent of
male and 69% of female
respondents believed
they could trust a fellow
villager to collect money
on their behalf. 91% of
male and 81% of female
respondents thought that
people in the village
generally help each other
(Beath et al., 2008, p.
12).
Seventy percent of
women agreed that
women should be
allowed council
membership; 86%
supported a separate
female council. 43% of
men agreed that women
should be granted
council membership, but
85% supported a
separate female council
(Beath et al., 2008, p.
viii).
Sixty-one percent of
male household
respondents and 50% of
male focus group
respondents reported
that there was at least
one dispute in their
village during the past
year. About 85% of male
household and male
focus group respondents
claimed that disputes in
their village were
successfully resolved
(Beath et al., 2008, p. ix).
DRC Tuungane Eighty-four percent in
control communities
opined that they are free
to participate in
decision-making
(Humphreys et al., 2012,
pp. 48, 62).
Ninety-three percent of
respondents in control
communities reported
that they would trust (be
willing to lend money to)
someone from their
village to go to market
(Humphreys et al., 2012,
p. 62).
The likelihood of using
elections in the RAPID
non-conditional cash
transfer exercise was just
as high approximately
50% treatment and
control (Humphreys
et al., 2012, p. 7).
In control communities,
just 14% report ethnic
cleavages, 22% report
class cleavages, and
12.5% report gender-
based cleavages
(Humphreys et al., 2012,
p. 63).
Liberia CDR
Program
Eighty percent in control
areas (at endline)
reported having attended
a town meeting (Fearon
et al., 2008, p. 17); At
baseline, nearly 90% re-
ported attending a town
meeting in the past six
months (Fearon,
Humphreys, &
Weinstein, 2007, p.3).
At baseline, 65%
reported willingness to
act as a guarantor (for
credit) for people of their
town (Fearon et al.,
2007, p. 40).
Sixty percent in control
areas agreed “that all
should be permitted to
take part in decisions”;
79% agreed “that women
should have equal
rights”; and 82% agreed
that “leaders should be
chosen through
elections” (Fearon et al.,
2008, p. 15).
Ninety percent of
baseline respondents
indicated that they
belonged to at least one
social organization and
50% indicated belonging
to at least three (Fearon
et al., 2011, p. 11).
Only 6% of respondents
said they faced
diﬃculties in gaining
acceptance in their
community (Fearon
et al., 2007, p. 35.).
Sierra Leone
GoBifo
About 85% of
respondents claimed to
have voted in the last
election (Casey et al.,
2011, p. 19).
More than “81% of
respondents had trusted
a neighbor with goods to
sell on their behalf in the
local market” (Casey
et al., 2012b, p. 16).
Eighty percent of control
respondents (at endline)
agreed with the
statement “It’s wrong to
pay a bribe to any
government oﬃcial” and
59% agreed that “no one
should be forced to do
something they don’t
want to do” (Casey et al.,
2012a, appendix, p. 64).
The average respondent
was a member of more
than 2 of 5 common
social groups (Casey
et al., 2012b, p. 16).
97% at baseline had no
report of a physical ﬁght
in the past year (Casey
et al., 2012a, appendix,
pp. 46, 64); 83% of con-
trol group (at endline)
reported no conﬂict in
which s/he needed help
from someone outside
the household to resolve
in the past year.
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across the studies suggests that without CDD programing,
communities exhibited high functioning in their informal insti-
tutions to promote broad-based collective action. Table 6
shows, as available 12, relatively high baseline or control com-
munity values (in each case, meaning levels in the absence of
CDD intervention) of such factors as the existence of local
governance institutions, participation in governance, trust of
other community members, some democratic norms, and
membership in community groups. The ﬁndings warrant
rethinking of contextual assumptions upon which CDD inter-
ventions take place. High social cohesion in conﬂict-aﬀected
contexts goes against the narrative proposed in the theoretical
and programmatic literature cited above, but is actually con-
sistent with recent micro-empirical work. Bellows and
Miguel (2009), Blattman (2009), Gilligan, Pasquale, and
Samii (2014), and Voors et al. (2012) have demonstrated thatthe experience of conﬂict tends to increase local collective
action capacities even among bystanders to violence (and
not solely among those mobilized to ﬁght). Indeed, the DRC
study authors pondered the possibility “that the program
[was] pitched at the wrong level to eﬀect change in governance
structures and social cohesion; Tuungane [focused] on the most
local levels which may not display the same problems of cohe-
sion and weak governance that are so visible in Congo at the
macro level” (Humphreys et al., 2012, p. 8).
Further, these studies do not provide details on the ways in
which the interventions create new institutions and/or build on
existing institutions, which would speak to whether these con-
ﬂicts really present “critical junctures” that suﬃciently disrupt
existing institutions so as to open windows of opportunity for
institution-building (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; North
et al., 2009). Nonetheless, the Sierra Leone study posits that
its lack of ﬁndings on social cohesion and governance out-
750 WORLD DEVELOPMENTcomes, in contrast to the Liberia program, may be due to the
fact that “the Liberia program operated in what was the ”epi-
center”’ of the latter years of that country’s civil war, and thus
may have faced more disruption to local institutions than the
Sierra Leone program did. Attempts to create new institutions
and norms where formal structures have broken down may
encounter less resistance than eﬀorts to persuade existing
authorities to adopt new practices” (Casey et al., 2011,
p.10). We do not have suﬃciently comparable data on the exis-
tence and solidity of local governing institutions to judge the
accuracy of this hypothesis. In any case, development pro-
graming in conﬂict-aﬀected contexts might do well to shift
gears away from attempting always to “heal” the social fabric
and toward trying to work with exceptional levels of cohesion
that are already present (Casey et al., 2012b).
(b) Program design
Various program design features run contrary to the CDD
theory of change or suggest a problem with an underspeciﬁed
theory of change. First, the relatively low intensity of CDD
interventions may not match the ambitiousness of social and
institutional transformation goals. For instance, the lack of
results may be due to the relative short length of the projects
(between 1.5 and 4 years). A survey of World Bank staﬀ on
general CDD programing asked “in your experience, what
would be the average number of years needed for project sup-
port of community groups initially formed under the [CDD]
process to reach a level of sustainability of community
processes requiring very limited outside support?” Responses
indicated that 52% thought the timeframe was six to ten years,
only 24% suggesting it was one to ﬁve years, and the rest sug-
gesting eleven years or more (Kumar, 2005, p. 101). Another
study suggests that CDD programing may require even more
time in conﬂict-aﬀected areas (World Bank, 2006, p. 22).
Researchers and practitioners that we interviewed stressed
their belief that repeated facilitation and multiple grants
would better stimulate the learning-by-doing that could lead
to social and institutional change. Indeed, there is some
evidence of stronger results from multiple rounds of gender-
based quotas in India (cited in Beath et al., 2012, p. 24), multi-
ple years of CDD programing in Indonesia (Barron, 2010, p.
21), and ﬁve years of participatory budgeting experience in
Brazil (cited in Bland, p. 869). A long-recognized tenet of
learning is repetition (Aspinwall, 1912). Finally, if CDD
appears to be a one-shot “project” rather than a system for
sustained support and repeated interaction, community mem-
bers may have little reason to invest in new institutions that
challenge elites or existing decision-making processes.
Likewise, some interviewees proposed that the relatively
small size of investments may be contrary to the transforma-
tive aspirations of CDD programing. In contrast to the huge
sums frequently quoted as spent on CDD initiatives, including
in the introduction to this paper, Table 2 shows that the sizes
of the block grants per capita topped out at around $6 or $7
per year. This could be compared, for instance, to the “big
push” Millennium Villages project which aims to spend $120
per capita per year (Earth Institute, 2008) 13. Humphreys
et al. raise a related problem of scale, positing that the invest-
ments in DRC were small relative to the huge population and
geographic scope of the project; only about 0.7% of the pop-
ulation were directly involved in village development council
trainings (2012, p. 18).
Second, contrary to a theory of change that prioritizes the
“exercise of voice and choice”, CDD programs remain sup-
ply-driven in the sense that program implementers initiatethe intervention and set the parameters within which voice
and choice can be exercised. Program-wide standardized rules
regulate local decision-making (Li, 2011). For example, CDD
implementing agencies typically limit, in some ways, the menu
of sub-projects from which communities may choose. If the
community determining investment priorities—thereby induc-
ing accountability, incentives to economize, and collective
ownership—is indeed a key part of the theory of change
(related to hypothesis 1), having the community choose how
to spend their block grant is crucial. An even partially restric-
tive menu may block that pathway. In all cases reviewed, pro-
gram design required that funds be spent on public-access,
rather than private, goods, although it is possible that targeted
private goods, to vulnerable community members for example,
would do the most to promote social cohesion. In some cases,
community priorities had to be redirected since funds would
not be enough to complete a community’s preferred project,
despite such determination of preferred projects being central
to the theory of change. It is a contradiction that the CDD
exercise is meant to empower communities and allow them
to make their own choices while constraining such choices
and the processes through which decisions are made to those
outsiders think are best (Chesterman, 2004).
Finally, the manner in which program design interacts with
local context merit further investigation. Interviewees raised
questions about the point of interventions and how they were
situated in relation to existing institutions. For Sierra Leone,
researchers pondered whether smaller communities were better
able to make use of the CDD/R model than larger ones,
although the study authors did not ﬁnd diﬀerential treatment
eﬀects in their study (Casey et al., 2011, pp. 23–4; Casey et al.,
2012a, p. 1784). Rather, looking across studies, one wonders
whether the opposite logic may be at work. As Table 2 shows,
the Liberia CDD program grouped villages into equally sized
“communities” based on proximity and existing ties to make
2,000 to 3,000 person units of intervention (Fearon et al.,
2008, p. 2). Presumably there would not have existed gover-
nance bodies at those levels. In contrast, in Sierra Leone,
where the CDD program may have replicated or mimicked
already existing institutions in pre-existing communities, its
ability to promote change may have been undermined. The
Afghanistan and DRC studies operated at somewhere between
these two scales.
How community-level institutions relate to the state was a
frequently raised programmatic issue in our interviews with
practitioners and researchers. One can contrast the programs
in Liberia and DRC, conceived and run by NGOs, to the
NSP in Afghanistan and GoBifo in Sierra Leone, which were
institutionally lodged within government departments. As
Cliﬀe et al. write, “two contradictory risks may occur with
the role of government—that it is either too close or too dis-
tant from the CDR process” (2003, p. 20). If CDD program-
ing relies entirely on existing institutions, they risk becoming
inadequately transformative and simply replicating existing
power structures, which is counter to the theory of change.
If, however, they create entirely new institutions, they may
induce conﬂict with elites, be irrelevant further down the road,
or undermine the legitimacy of government structures, which
is objectionable in conﬂict-aﬀected contexts. Mansuri and
Rao deem the best approaches to participatory development
those that work with a “sandwich”, based on eﬀective top-
down and bottom-up support (2012, p. 287). Bland (2010)
shows that progressively minded local elites, minimal interfer-
ence from existing local governance institutions, and legal
protection for citizens to express themselves to be crucial to
the success of participatory budgeting in El Salvador. Similar
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require further consideration.
While each of these explanations is plausible and widely pos-
ited in interviews and evaluation documents, the one case
where there were some evident eﬀects, Liberia, actually had
the shortest implementation period, the lowest total invest-
ment per capita, the largest community size on average and
was run by an NGO quite distant from the state. The sample
of four is not large enough to come to any deﬁnitive conclu-
sion. But Spears’ thoughts warrant consideration as they apply
to externally driven eﬀorts to build social institutions:
When eﬀorts at building peace have failed, the assumption
is made that there has been a problem in terms of imple-
mentation or method. . .So the international community
continues to advocate the same practices but recommends
starting sooner and allowing for longer time frames, being
more pro-active, being more inclusive, being more free of
other countries and their meddling ways, involving more
of the community, and being more educated and informed.
All of these may be worthy endeavours. . . .it is not clear
that more of anything will produce more favourable [. . .]
outcomes (Spears, 2012, p. 300).(c) Methodological issues
The ﬁndings also raise methodological issues that ought to
be addressed in further research. First is the question of levels
of analysis. Since community leaders are exposed to the most
intensive facilitation in most of the programs under study
here, one can expect diﬀerent changes at the level of leadership
versus at the level of the general population. As Humphreys
et al. suggest for the DRC, “it is possible that the primary
eﬀects of Tuungane are on leaders in communities, for example
those that took part in trainings directly. If this is the case, the
research is not well calibrated to capture those eﬀects” (2012,
p. 75). At present, these programs are based on a theory of
change that focuses on changing the general population and
the evaluations are measuring this accordingly.
A second methodological issue concerns the choice of mea-
sures. The studies found support for hypothesis 1 and also for
the fact that the CDD programs were delivering beneﬁts “as
promised.” But, as raised above, it is often diﬃcult to compar-
atively interpret such measures as participation rates. The
measures for hypothesis 1 also appear to leave out some indi-
cators that would be crucial to the theory of change. The com-
munity projects usually involved new infrastructure, and yet
none of these studies looked in detail at the quality of what
was built. 14 For eﬀects of CDD to be durable and transferable
(hypothesis 2), one would expect that not only does the expe-
rience of participating in CDD have to be positive, but the
outputs need to be strong to illustrate what can be achieved
by collective action. In our interviews, several of the study
authors and practitioners noted that project quality was often
quite poor. There were particular concerns regarding places
where the program required community labor for technically
diﬃcult projects, such as roads and irrigation, with little qual-
ity control. In Sierra Leone the disbursement of block grants
were sometimes so delayed that community members called
the project “GoBien” (backward march) instead of GoBifo
(forward march) (Sulley et al., 2010, p. 60). Our interviews also
suggested that in many instances, programs were plagued by
seasonal challenges, diﬃculty of accessing remote villages,
and lack of qualiﬁed contractors to execute projects. In some
cases, the lack of complementary inputs was a problem, such
as new classrooms in the absence of teachers or books. Finally,facilitators guided communities through the steps of the
program, but their training and extent of involvement likely
varied across projects. In conﬂict-aﬀected contexts, the social
position of facilitators is an important consideration but none
of the studies evaluated facilitators’ roles systematically (Cliﬀe
et al., 2003, p. 13; Haider, 2009, p. 17). Factoring these consid-
erations into indicators for hypothesis 1 could counterweigh
the positive ﬁndings, thereby helping to explain why durable
and transferable change (hypothesis 2) did not materialize.
Another example in relation to choice of measures concerns
behavioral versus attitudinal measures. The four studies were
innovative in the use of structured behavioral activities for
measuring such eﬀects. On the one hand, the use of behavioral
measures is surely an improvement over relying exclusively on
survey responses, as it is all too easy for survey respondents to
say what they think researchers want to hear. Even when sur-
vey responses are accurate reﬂections of attitudes, such atti-
tudes do not always translate into behavior (Glaeser,
Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; King et al., 2010).
On the other hand, such measures can be diﬃcult to interpret.
Fearon et al.’s study pioneered the use of behavioral games in
measuring the eﬀects of CDD. They found evidence for posi-
tive eﬀects on collective action capacity, but only in the
mixed-gender public goods games, potentially mimicking a
community development council situation. One author sus-
pected that if they were to test with a situation that less pre-
cisely mimicked what went on in the CDD program (such as
the RAPID test from the Humphreys et al. study in the
DRC), they may not have found signiﬁcant eﬀects. In one of
the structured community activities in Casey et al.’s Sierra
Leone study, communities were given a tarp and then the
researchers observed how it was used. The tarp ending up in
the home of a leader would be interpreted as elite capture.
But, an alternative interpretation (arising from our interviews
with practitioners) is that, maybe, the community members
did not have an immediate use for the tarp, and therefore
stored it in the leader’s backroom.
Third, in the theory section above we noted that there might
be reason to worry of negative eﬀects to the extent that the
introduction of CDD induces conﬂict or competition for spoils
among community decision-makers. Our hypotheses are posed
in a “one-sided” manner in that they focus on potential posi-
tive eﬀects. Of course, the manner of estimation and testing in
the primary studies allows for one to pick up on perverse, neg-
ative eﬀects even when the expectation is for positive eﬀects.
But the question remains as to whether more consideration
of possible adverse eﬀects would lead one to include additional
outcomes in the evaluation.
All of these methodological issues raise the question of how
additional and possibly diﬀerent evidence may have been gen-
erated by complementary methods—in particular qualitative
inquiry. As Levy-Paluck explains, “using qualitative research
methods in [a] ﬁeld experiment could have provided a diﬀerent
understanding of the causal eﬀect, identiﬁed possible causal
mechanisms of change, and framed new interpretive under-
standings of [such issues as] authority, democracy, and gender
within an experimentally assessed instance of social change”
(2008, p. 24; see also Barron, Diprose, & Woolcock, 2011).
A fruitful area for methodological development would be in
ﬁndings ways to integrate more open-ended qualitative inquiry
with quantitative ﬁeld experimental methods. One recent illus-
tration of the value of such multi-method research emerges in
a discussion of how factors often considered measures of
social capital, such as community meetings, can actually refer
to mechanisms through which elites exert authority
(Acemoglu, Reed, & Robinson, 2013).
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Based on a review of rigorous impact evaluations from pro-
grams in Afghanistan, DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and
interviews with practitioners and academic researchers, we
ﬁnd that the record of CDD in promoting institution building
in conﬂict-aﬀected contexts is positive in the short-term of the
intervention but, on the whole, discouraging in terms of dura-
ble and transferable change. Based on evidence from these
studies, we ﬁnd the motivating assumptions that conﬂict-
aﬀected areas exhibit a special need and opportunity for build-
ing social institutions problematic. Program design issues may
undermine performance, including panacea-type thinking
combined with a relatively low intensity of intervention, the
supply-driven nature of CDD that contradicts core tenets of
the theory of change, and the ways in which the relationships
between design and context may constitute enabling condi-
tions for CDD programing. In terms of evaluation strategy,
the choice of levels of analysis and speciﬁc measures in the
evaluations may also help explain the results.
Our review suggests some priority areas for a future research
agenda on CDD and related programs in conﬂict-aﬀected
areas. In the studies reviewed, the counterfactual to CDD is
no project at all. This set of evaluations does not compare
CDD to other types of projects, including top-down or cen-
tralized provision of services or other cohesion or institution
building programs. To really answer questions for the aid
and development communities, we need to know which type
of intervention is preferable in a given context. CDD is also
implemented and evaluated as a bundled treatment—it has
social (ie. facilitation and institution building) and economic
(i.e. block grant) components. None of the evaluations to date
can parse social from economic eﬀects of the intervention. As
the authors of the Sierra Leone evaluation note,“. . .for every
dollar spent directly on community projects, roughly one dol-
lar was spent ensuring the money was used well through facil-
itation, administration and oversight” (Casey et al., 2011,
p.11). They continue that “the key question this evaluation
cannot address is whether the program would be just as eﬀec-
tive if the budget balance was shifted toward less facilitation
and more grants to communities” (Casey et al., 2011, p. 45).We may ask similar questions about the speciﬁc roles of the
diﬀerent design features (duration, size of grants, gender
requirements, and other features) and how such design fea-
tures interact with local institutions, state institutions, and
other contextual features.
Our review also leads to a number of suggestions for donors,
policy-makers, and practitioners. Our interviews revealed that
there are private and public “transcripts” about CDD: opin-
ions that people are willing to share about CDD in private dif-
fer from those that they share in public (Cooke & Kothari,
2001; Scott, 1990). Like broader development discourse (Mos-
se in Li, 2011, p.57), writing about CDD regularly obscures
the concerns and doubts of development practitioners, which
came across strongly in interviews. CDD can only improve
if all stakeholders are encouraged to be open about their gen-
uine thoughts. At present, even though interviewees often call
the theory of change “ridiculous” in private, public program
goals very much aspire to fast-track institution building. To
the extent that such goals are secondary, donors and imple-
menters may want to ensure that this is understood and com-
municated clearly so as to moderate expectations about what
such programs might produce. When outcomes are unrealistic
and the intervention inadequately matched to the theory of
change, impact evaluations are not likely to ﬁnd positive
results.
To the extent that the transformational goals are in fact
primary, the ﬁndings from the studies reviewed here should
serve as a wake-up call. Of course, one could propose, fol-
lowing Khwaja (2009), to forget about “ﬁxing” social cohe-
sion and rather focus on program and institutional designs
that have been eﬀective in settings that appear to lack sup-
portive social institutions. How supply-driven such institu-
tion building could be merits continued consideration. Or
one might retain the emphasis on building social institutions,
but consider that such transformation may not arise as a by-
product of development programs. King et al. (2010) found
that curriculum-based community building programs more
consistently achieved social cohesion goals than CDD pro-
grams, suggesting the need for focused and sustained atten-
tion to issues of social cohesion per se if social
transformation is the goal.NOTES1. Mansuri and Rao (2012) draw a distinction between induced and
organic participation, with CDD an example of the former.
2. This paper summarizes and builds on the results of King (2013).
3. Details of the search are described in King (2013). Our study has very
diﬀerent goals than the World Bank’s (2006) review of CDD in conﬂict-
aﬀected areas, given that the World Bank review was focused on program
design and inner workings rather than on the eﬀects of the programs on
host communities.
4. Our search updated the list in King et al. (2010), focusing only on
CDD programs in conﬂict-aﬀected countries.
5. King (2013) provides more detail on the interviews.
6. We had considered organizing the eﬀect estimates by outcome
concept, but doing so was complicated by the extreme heterogeneity in
the ways that outcomes were deﬁned. For instance, the standard index of
participation from the Liberia study is based on “reports on communityinitiatives and willingness to work together, individual participation in
community meetings and contacts with various authorities, frequency of
community meetings, and intention to vote and work with a political
party” (Fearon et al., 2011, p. 48). In contrast, the standard index of
participation in local governance in the Sierra Leone study includes 15
outcomes: “Respondents voted in 2007 1st round Presidential elections,
2007 2nd round Presidential elections, and 2008 Local elections; A
community member stood for Paramount Chief, Section Chief, Local
Council and WDC; Respondents have met a Local Councillor;
Respondents have attended a WDC meeting; Respondents feel like they
could change an unjust chiefdom law and an unjust LC policy;
Respondents believe the LC listens to what their community says;
Community has a Village Development Committee (VDC); Community
has a Village Development Plan (VDP); Respondents discuss politics” plus
a host of conditional outcomes (Casey et al., 2011, p. 29).
7. In Afghanistan, an average of 140 villagers (plus 14 committee
members) attended village meetings to select sub-projects, representing
more than a third of the adult village population on average; in cases
where sub-projects were selected by referendum (a variation in treat-
ment), on average, more than 250 people voted, representing 60% of the
FAST-TRACK INSTITUTION BUILDING IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES? 753adult village population (Beath et al., 2013a, 13). The DRC study reports
that 30% of the total treated population, and 23% of women and 36% of
men, attended at least one meeting (Humphreys et al., 2012, 22). In
Liberia, 53% of registered voters participated in elections of CDC
members (International Rescue Committee, 2008, 3) and 60% of the total
treatment population “actively participated” in bringing materials to,
and working on, sub-projects (International Rescue Committee 2008,
10). In Sierra Leone, 64% of respondents said that they attended the
meeting where the Village Facilitator was chosen and 41% said they
attended a meeting to draft the Village Development Plan (Casey et al.,
2011, 32).8. With control community values of 84% positive responses, a threshold
may already have been reached. It is diﬃcult to compare this ﬁgure to the
other studies which have values standardized back to zero.9. Casey et al. stress that the eﬀects on the “participation in local
governance” index were driven by outcomes associated with the function-
ing of local development committees during the CDD program’s
implementation period (2012a, p. 1801).
10. We thank Robert Blair for raising this question.
11. For a more fulsome discussion of the economic impacts of these
CDD programs, see King (2013).
12. We chose to include measures of governance and social cohesion that
were most repeated and comparable across studies.
13. Thanks to Macartan Humphreys for highlighting this comparison.
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